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Abstract 
The aim of this study was to examine the relation of the 
consensuality of answers in syllogistic reasoning problems to 
metacognitive judgments and response times. In two 
experiments, participants (N=126) solved syllogistic problems 
and made metacognitive judgments (judgment of confidence 
in the correctness of the answer and judgment of task 
difficulty), after or before solving each problem. 
Intraindividual correlation coefficients (Goodman-Kruskal 
gamma coefficient) between reasoning accuracy and 
metacognitive judgments and between answer consensuality 
and metacognitive judgments were computed from the joint 
data of both experiments. Mean gamma coefficients were 
higher for consensuality than for reasoning accuracy both for 
judgments of confidence and judgments of task difficulty. 
Also, consensual answers were given more quickly than non-
consensual answers. The results indicate that reasoners, 
instead of monitoring their actual performance, seem to rely 
on different type of cues while making metacognitive 
judgments in syllogistic reasoning. Both consensuality and its 
relation to metacognitive judgments could be the outcome of 
processes of the generation of possible answers while solving 
syllogistic reasoning problems.  
Keywords: metacognition; syllogistic reasoning; judgment 
accuracy  
Introduction 
Metacognitive processes of monitoring and control have 
been extensively studied in the domain of memory 
(Dunlosky & Bjork, 2008). It has been recognized that it is 
important to expand the study of metacognition to other 
domains of cognition, in particular to the psychology of 
reasoning (Thompson, 2009; Thompson, Prowse Turner, & 
Pennycook, 2011).  
According to a theoretical framework proposed by Nelson 
and Narens (1990), people make various metacognitive 
judgments when they attempt to monitor and control their 
own memory, such as judgments of learning and confidence 
judgments. The relationship between these judgments and 
performance can be determined in two ways (Koriat, 2007). 
Absolute accuracy (or calibration) is the degree to which the 
mean value of judgments corresponds to the mean actual 
performance, and relative accuracy is measured by the 
within-subject correlation between judgments and 
performance, typically measured by the Goodman-Kruskal 
gamma coefficient (Nelson, 1984). Accuracy of 
metacognitive judgments in the domain of reasoning can be 
determined in a similar way. Furthermore, research on 
metacognitive monitoring in reasoning should study  
problems such as whether confidence is correlated to 
performance, the accuracy of reasoners' metacognitive 
judgments, the ability of reasoners to discriminate tasks 
which they solved correctly from those which they solved 
incorrectly, and the relation of the accuracy of their 
metacognitive judgments to reasoning ability. 
Several studies have addressed the role of metacognition 
in syllogistic reasoning. In particular, these studies had 
examined the relationship between confidence judgments 
and reasoning accuracy (Prowse Turner & Thompson, 2009; 
Shynkaruk & Thompson, 2006). The results showed that 
reasoning accuracy and confidence were generally not 
correlated, and that confidence and accuracy were mediated 
by different variables. 
In this paper we will present additional analyses of our 
previously published results (Bajšanski, Močibob & 
Valerjev, 2014, Experiments 2 and 3). In this study we 
analyzed the accuracy of metacognitive judgments in 
syllogistic reasoning. The most important result of our 
investigation was the low absolute and relative accuracy of 
these judgments. Participants were overconfident and 
metacognitive judgments generally were not correlated to 
reasoning accuracy. Therefore, reasoning accuracy and 
metacognitive judgments are influenced by different factors. 
What is under question here are the sources on which 
reasoners base their judgments, if the accuracy of responses 
is not the source.  
According to cue utilization approach to metacognitive 
judgments in a domain of memory (Koriat, 1997), 
metacognitive judgments are based on various cues which 
differ in their validity, or relation to actual performance. 
Some of these cues are processing fluency, accessibility, 
familiarity of retrieval cues and ease of retrieval. To the 
extent to which the cues are related to actual memory 
performance, metacognitive judgments will also be 
accurate.  
Thompson et al. (2011) identified three types of cues 
which can determine metacognitive judgments in reasoning 
tasks (feeling of rightness): answer fluency (the ease with 
which the initial conclusion comes to mind), conclusion 
acceptance and conflicting answers. Fluent answers, 
accepted answers and non-conflicting answers should be 
assigned higher confidence ratings.  
Koriat (2008) reported correlation between consensuality 
and confidence in answering general-information questions. 
Consensuality is defined as the percentage of participants 
who endorse a particular answer. Consensual answers 
(answers endorsed by most participants) are assigned higher 
confidence ratings than non-consensual answers.  Koriat 
proposed that two potential cues – decision time and self-
89
November, 28th – P02
consistency – are related to both consensuality and 
confidence.  
Data on the consensuality of answers in syllogistic 
reasoning problems (conclusions accepted by most 
participants for each syllogism) are available in a meta-
analytic study on syllogistic reasoning by Khemlani & 
Johnson-Laird (2012). In line with this aforementioned 
analysis, we hypothesize that answer fluency should be 
related both to metacognitive judgments and the 
consensuality of answers in syllogistic reasoning. The first 
relationship is based on a large body of data indicating that 
fluency of processing is related to metacognitive judgments 
in various domains (Thompson, 2009). As for the second 
proposed relationship, it is based only on tentative evidence. 
First, Koriat (2008) found that in answering general-
information questions, consensual answers are reached 
faster than non-consensual answers. Second, we compared 
one-model and multiple-model syllogisms (Bara, 
Bucciarelli, & Johnson-Laird, 1995) for percentages of 
consensual conclusions reported by Khemlani and Johnson-
Laird, and it was revealed that these percentages were 
higher for one-model than for multiple-model syllogisms. 
One-model syllogisms are also processed more rapidly 
(more fluently) than multiple-model syllogisms (Bucciarelli 
& Johnson-Laird, 1999). However, the possible relationship 
between consensuality of conclusions and their response 
latencies should be studied more systematically. 
The aim of the analyses presented here was to further 
explore the basis of metacognitive judgments in syllogistic 
reasoning, following the hypothesis that metacognitive 
judgments should be related to the consensuality of answers. 
Consensual answers are expected to be associated with 
higher metacognitive judgments than non consensual 
answers. They are also expected to be processed faster than 
non consensual answers. 
Method 
Participants and design 
A total of 126 psychology students participated in two 
experiments. Participants solved syllogistic problems and 
made different metacognitive judgments. In Experiment 1 
(N=64), participants made judgments after solving each 
reasoning problem and in Experiment 2 (N=62) participants 
made judgments after a quick overview of each problem 
before solving it. Half of the participants in each experiment 
rated their performance (E1: how confident they are they 
solved the task correctly; E2: how confident they are they 
will provide the correct answer) and the other half of the 
participants rated the perceived difficulty of the task. The 
ratings were given on a 7-point scale (1- not confident at 
all/not difficult at all, 7-extremely confident/very difficult). 
 
Materials and procedure 
Twenty four syllogistic problems (sixteen valid and eight 
invalid) were used in this study. Problems included 
syllogisms of all four different figures and of different 
degrees of difficulty.  
In each trial, participants were shown two premises 
containing professions as A, B and C terms. The premises 
were followed by five possible answers (four conclusion 
statements and a “no valid conclusion” option) and 
participants had to choose the answer that logically followed 
the given premises or to select a “no valid conclusion” 
option if they thought it was impossible to deduce a 
logically valid conclusion from the given premises.  
The experiments were programmed and run using E-
prime. Participants were tested individually. The 
instructions were presented on a computer screen and were 
followed by two practice problems. Each participant was 
then presented with 24 randomly ordered tasks. Participants 
were asked to make a metacognitive rating after solving 
each reasoning problem (E1) or before solving each 
problem (E2), and also by pressing the corresponding key. 
There was no set time limit for giving the answers and 
ratings. 
Results and discussion 
The data from both experiments were combined and 
analyzed jointly. In order to examine the basis of 
metacognitive judgments in syllogistic reasoning for each 
participant, we computed two intraindividual correlation 
coefficients. First, the Goodman-Kruskal gamma coefficient 
was computed between reasoning accuracy and 
metacognitive judgments. Second, the gamma coefficient 
was computed between answer consensuality and 
metacognitive judgments. Consensual answers were 
assigned a value of 1, and non-consensual a value of 0. This 
method of coding was implemented because it allowed us to 
compare gamma coefficients calculated for accuracy and 
consensuality.  
Two two-way repeated measures ANOVAs were 
conducted, first for judgments of performance, and second, 
for judgments of difficulty. In both ANOVAs there were 
two independent variables: type of relation (gamma 
correlation between judgments and accuracy and gamma 
correlation between judgments and consensuality) and 
judgment phase (before or after answering).  
First, for judgments of performance, a significant main 
effect of relation type was obtained (F1,60 = 31.05, p < .001): 
mean gamma coefficients were higher for consensuality (M 
= .40, SEM = .05) than for reasoning accuracy (M = .10, 
SEM = .06). The effect of judgment phase and interaction 
effect were not significant (F1,60 = 0.08, F1,60 = 2.37, 
respectively).     
Second, for judgments of difficulty a significant main 
effect of relation type was obtained (F1,60 = 22.61, p < .001): 
mean gamma coefficients were higher for consensuality (M 
= .32, SEM = .05) than for reasoning accuracy (M = .07, 
SEM = .05). The effect of judgment phase was not 
significant (F1,60 = 0.14), and interaction effect was 
marginally significant (F1,60 = 3.71, p = .06). 
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Third, the response times differed for problems in which 
participants gave consensual answers and problems in 
which they gave non-consensual answers. Consensual 
answers were given more quickly than non-consensual, both 
in Experiment 1 (t63= 7.53, p < .001; Consensual: M = 
23.88s, SD = 8.30; Non-consensual: M = 31.27s, SD = 
13.06) and Experiment 2 (t60= 6.95, p < .001; Consensual M 
= 15.35s, SD = 9.35, Non-consensual M = 21.00s, SD = 
11.77).  
The results clearly point to the conclusion that while 
making metacognitive judgments reasoners do not monitor 
their actual reasoning performance, but they rely on 
different type of cues. However, they cannot base their 
judgments on consensuality itself, because they do not know 
what the typical answers given by other participants in the 
studies of syllogistic reasoning are. The consensuality of 
answers, as well as its relation to metacognitive judgments 
and to response times, is probably the outcome of the 
processes of the generation of possible answers during 
syllogistic reasoning. Problems that seem to the reasoner to 
have more than one possible solution will be perceived as 
more difficult and will be associated with lower confidence 
judgments. However, in such a situation it is probable that a 
greater number of different responses will be generated by 
different participants, therefore increasing the number of 
participants who choose a non-consensual answer. Problems 
that bring to mind a single solution will be perceived as 
easy, non-conflicting problems, and they will also lead a 
majority of participants to endorse a consensual answer.  It 
is important to notice that these solutions are often not the 
correct ones in syllogistic tasks. Furthermore, we propose 
that consensual answers are the ones which come to mind 
first, even for syllogistic problems which elicit many 
different responses, and are therefore likely to be assigned 
higher metacognitive judgments. This hypothesis should be 
tested in further studies. 
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